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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ALLOWED TO
APPOINT ELECTION COMMISSIONER NOT REcommE NED.-A county
political chairman recommended and certified himself, pursuant to
Election Law section 52, for the position of election commissioner,
on three separate occasions. On each occasion defendant Board of
Supervisors unanimously refused to make the appointment. In response to the chairman's public refusal to name anyone else, the
Board designated an enrolled Democrat, not recommended by the
chairman. Plaintiff, a taxpayer, voter, and enrolled Democrat,
brought suit under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act in the nature
of mandamus to compel the Board to revoke the appointment and
require defendant to hereafter appoint only persons recommended by
the chairman.
The Supreme Court in granting the petition annulled the Board's
appointment and ordered future appointments to be made only from
those persons recommended by the county chairman. The Appellate
Division reversed on the law and the facts asserting that the petition
should have been dismissed as a matter of law or in the alternative,
considering the facts disclosed and the legal issue presented, as a
matter of judicial discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal as a proper exercise of discretion and did not reach the merits.
Ahern v. Board of Supervisors, 7 App. Div.2d 538, 185 N.Y.S.2d
669 (2d Dep't), affd, 6 N.Y.2d 376, 160 N.E.2d 640, 189 N.Y.S.2d
888 (1959).
Mandamus was designed to compel action or inaction by a body
in the enforcement of duties specifically enjoined by law. The duty
could be imposed by the common law or by statute.' Mandamus was
a prerogative writ employed at common law and was issued in the
name of the king.2 New York at common law employed this writ
as a method of control over administrative bodies and officers. 3
The writ of mandamus as such was abolished in 1937, but the
relief formerly obtained under the old writ was provided for under

1
Proposed Simplification. of the Remedies of Certiorari,Mandanss and
Prohibition, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE
OF NENW YORK 134-5 (1937)
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL].

[hereinafter cited

as TIanD ANNUAL REPORT OF

2 People ex rel. Aspinwall v. Supervisors of Richmond, 28 N.Y. 112, 114
THRD ANNUAL REPoRtr OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 138.

(1863);

3 Goldstein, Judicial Review of Administrative Action Through Article 78
of the Civil Practice Act (1937-1951), 2 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 199-200 (1951).
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Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act. 4 The legislature merely did
away with the procedural formalism of the writ system and retained
the substantive remedy which the old writ had afforded.5 Hence
today the courts issue orders in the nature of mandamus, whereas
formerly writs were issued. 6
Proceedings in the nature of mandamus pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Act can be employed to compel performance
of duties specifically enjoined by law as well as to remedy improper
administrative determinations decided otherwise than from a prescribed quasi-judicial hearing.7 Since it is difficult to find clear-cut
distinctions in cases of "mandamus," the courts generally do not indicate the specific category within
which they feel an individual
8
mandamus proceeding should lie.

Mandamus must be brought by one having a clear legal right
to the remedy 9 against a body or officer. 10 Although it will lie to
compel action, the person or body charged cannot be told to exercise
discretionary power in a particular way." Mandamus is considered
to be of an extraordinary character, 1 2 and even where it is established that a clear legal right to relief exists, the issuance of mandamus remains discretionary with the court.13 Hence, mandamus
will generally not be granted where the plaintiff has another adequate
remedy at law.' 4 Mandamus is considered to be a legal remedy, but
4 N.Y. Civ. Pac. ACT § 1283.
5 Toscano v. McGoldrick, 300 N.Y.

156, 161-62, 89 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1949).

6 Coombs v. Edwards, 280 N.Y. 361, 364, 21 N.E.2d 353, 354 (1939).
7 BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE

ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF

Nmv

YORK

(1942). "Thus where a petitioner seeks to compel the issuance of a license
which an administrative agency has determined not to issue, and where the
petitioner contends that there is no proper basis (in fact, in law, or in the
exercise of administrative discretion) for denying issuance of the license, it
may properly be said either that the petitioner is seeking to compel performance
of a duty specifically enjoined by law upon the agency, or that the petitioner
is seeking to review the agency's adverse determination." Id. at 351.
8 Id. at 351-52.
9 Toscano v. McGoldrick, 300 N.Y. 156, 160, 89 N.E.2d 873, 874 (1949).
10 "The expression 'body or officer' includes every court, tribunal, board,
corporation, officer, or other person or aggregation of persons, whose action

may be affected by the proceeding under this article." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT
§ 1284.
11 Gimprich v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 401, 406, 118 N.E.2d 578, 580
(1954).
12 Andresen v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 282, 14 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1938).
13 Frazier-Davis Constr. v. Gerosa, 6 App. Div.2d 112, 113, 175 N.Y.S.2d
765, 767 (1st Dep't 1958) ; Toscano v. McGoldrick, supra note 9; Andresen v.
Rice, supra note 12.
14 Towers Management Corp. v. Thatcher, 271 N.Y. 94, 97, 2 N.E.2d 273,
274 (1936). But see State exr rel. Bond v. Register of Conveyances, 162 La.
362, 110 So. 559, 560 (1926): "Code Prac. art. 831 provides that a judge
may, in his discretion, issue a writ of mandamus even when the complainant
has other means of relief, if the slowness of an ordinary proceeding would
be likely to cause a delay which would hamper the administration of justice";
cf. People ex rel. Frost v. New York Cent. & IT.R.R.R., 168 N.Y. 187, 195,
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is said to be governed by equitable principles. 15
From a procedural viewpoint, mandamus is denominated a special proceeding and not an action.'0 Therefore, it must be applied
for in a distinct and separate way,17 and will not be available in an
ordinary action.'
In the instant case the Appellate Division questioned the plaintiff's legal right to bring a mandamus-like proceeding. The Court
felt that the plaintiff had not sustained any special private injury nor
shown any danger or peril to the public interest. 19 It has, nevertheless, been held that a citizen-voter has a sufficient interest to apply
for mandamus to compel a public officer to perform his public duty.20
The New York State Constitution guarantees the right of franchise to its citizens. 2' The plaintiff, it would seem, is only trying
to protect that right. If bipartisan control of election administration
is not maintained, there is great danger that its function might be
perverted and the free vote imperiled. The legislature saw the necessity of bipartisan control over the election commission and passed a

61 N.E. 172, 175 (1901): "[When] . . . an action for damages . . . would
be inadequate ... the existence of an equitable remedy is no bar to the writ
although it may influence the court in the exercise of its discretion."
'5 Coombs v. Edwards, 280 N.Y. 361, 364, 21 N.E.2d 353, 354 (1939);
see, e.g., MacKechnie v. Board of Educ., 11 Misc.2d 926, 927, 173 N.Y.S.2d
888, 889 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 6 App. Div.2d 1052, 179 N.Y.S.2d 659 (2d Dep't
1958), where the court considered hardship to the defendant and interests of
third parties in granting mandamus. In Fiorini v. Parkhurst, 198 Misc. 796,
798, 100 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (Sup. Ct. 1950), petitioner, improperly dismissed
from the fire department because of the commission of a crime, was denied
mandamus to compel a technically proper hearing because he did not come
into the court with clean hands. Public Serv. Comm'n v. International Ry.,
224 N.Y. 631, 632, 120 N.E. 727, 728 (1918) (per curiam), held that where
plaintiff sued for a writ of mandamus, it was reversible error to grant judgment on the pleadings and not try as an issue of fact, defendant-railroad's
alleged inability to pay or borrow sufficient funds to meet a retroactive wage
scale being demanded. "The courts will not command the defendant, under

pain of punishment for contempt, to do what it cannot." Ibid. In People
ex rel. Hunter v. National Park Bank, 122 App. Div. 635, 641, 107 N.Y. Supp.
369, 374 (1st Dep't 1907), the court held that where the facts justified an
inference that the application for mandamus was made in bad faith and to
effectuate undisclosed schemes against a corporation, mandamus did not lie
to force the corporation to show its stockbook to plaintiff-shareholder.
16 Deleyer v. Britt, 212 N.Y. 565, 106 N.E. 57 (1914)
(memorandum
decision).
'7Youmans
v. Terry, 32 Hun 624, 625 (Sup. Ct 1884); see N.Y. Civ.

PRAc. Acr §§ 4, 5, 1288.
is People ex rel. Dunphy v. Chaney, 171 App. Div. 303, 307, 156 N.Y. Supp.
1035, 1038 (3d Dep't 1916); People ex tel. Doran v. Harwick, 48 App. Div.
559, 560, 62 N.Y. Supp. 897, 898 (2d Dep't 1900).
'19 Ahern v. Board of Supervisors, 7 App. Div. 538, 185 N.Y.S.2d 669 (2d
Dep't 1959).
20 McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N.Y. 401, 411, 153 N.E. 849, 851 (1926) ; People
ex rel. Daley v. Rice, 129 N.Y. 449, 454, 29 N.E. 355, 356 (1891).
21 N.Y. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 34

law to implement this policy.22 It is difficult to think of a subject of
greater public interest, than keeping voting rights unhampered and
free from partisan control.
The Appellate Division based its decision in large measure upon
the nature of mandamus as an extraordinary and discretionary
remedy. The courts are "chary to issue it so as to cause disorder
and confusion in public affairs, even though there may be a strict
legal right." 23 The Court suggests that there might be a complete
breakdown in election administration with a resulting disfranchisement of the voters if a political squabble were permitted to thwart
the purposes of effective government.2 4 In Kane v. Gaynor,25 however, the court realistically overruled an analogous contention on the
grounds that "self-interest" would require a person such as the county
chairman to propose an acceptable person. Further, since the former
election commissioner continues in office until a qualified person has
been appointed, 26 it does not seem likely that election administration
will fail from lack of proper supervision.
The law appears to be well settled that a Board of Supervisors
cannot appoint a person to the position of Commissioner of Elections
2T
who has not been recommended by the county political chairman.
In Kane v. Gaynor the petitioner brought a writ of mandamus to
compel his appointment to the position of election commissioner.
The majority opinion of the Appellate Division in affirming the Special Term construed a statute substantially identical 28 with the one
in the instant case and held that the petitioner could not by a writ
of mandamus force the mayor to appoint him to the position of election commissioner, and further that the scope of appointment was
not limited to persons merely recommended by the chairman. Judge
Burr concurred in the result, but disagreed with the majority in
stating that the power of appointment was limited in selection to
those persons duly recommended by the chairman. The Court of

22 See N.Y.
23 Ahern v.

ELECTION LAW § 52.
Board of Supervisors, 7 App. Div. 538, 545, 185 N.Y.S.2d 669,
676 (2d Dep't 1959).
241d. at 544-45, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
25 144 App. Div. 196, 207, 129 N.Y. Supp. 280, 288 (?,d Dep't), aff'd inem.
on concurring
opinion of Burr, 1., 202 N.Y. 615, 616, 96 N.E. 1117 (1911).
26
N.Y. PuB. OmcEa's LAW § 5; Furk v. Board of Supervisors, 1 App.
Div.2d 794, 148 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dep't 1956) (memorandum decision);
People ex rel. Woods v. Flynn, 81 Misc. 279, 286, 142 N.Y. Supp. 230, 234
(Sup. Ct. 1913). For an interesting corollary of this problem, where it is
stated that a hold-over is entitled to full salary, see 7 Oes. STATE CompT. 125
(1951).
2
7Kane v. Gaynor, 144 App. Div. 196, 207, 129 N.Y. Suop. 280, 288 (2d
Dep't), aff'd mere. on concurring opinion of Burr, 1., 202 N.Y. 615, 616,
96 N.E. 1117 (1911).
28 Compare N.Y. ELECTFON LAW § 52 with N.Y. CoNsoL. LAWS 1909, ch.
17, § 194, amended, N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1911, ch. 649, § 194, making obsolete
provisions wherein the appointive power resided in the mayor.
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29
Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division on Judge Burr's opinion.
Although the holding in the Kane case was that the court would
not force the mayor to appoint a particular person, it would appear
that Judge Burr's opinion has nevertheless been regarded as the
law.30 Even if it were not, this in and of itself would not prevent a
mandamus-type proceeding."
It only serves dangerous precedent to permit the Board at its
caprice to appoint persons who have not been duly recommended.
The possibilities of partisan control of the election administration
run greater risk of effectuating disfranchisement of the voters than
does the possibility that the election machinery itself will fall apart.
Perhaps it is the concern of the majority in the instant case,
that if the appointment is construed as being illegal, the official acts
of the appointee may be deemed void. There is no doubt that such
a determination would tend to disrupt local government. Nevertheless it would seem better to arrest such a situation rather than encourage its subsistence. If the official acts of the appointee are void,
his continuance in office cannot be said to nurture stable government.
Procedurally, where title to an office is in dispute, the proper
remedy lies in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding.3 2 This general rule has been held inapplicable, however, where only questions
of law are in issue and not questions of fact. 33 Where the facts are
undisputed and there is a clear legal right to the remedy to be enforced with only a question of law involved, relief can be granted in
of mandamus and therefore, quo warranto
a proceeding in the nature
4
is not the sole remedy.
Although the Appellate Division painstakingly pointed out that
a quo warranto-like proceeding was probably the proper remedy,
doubt as to its availability because no facts appear to
there is serious
35
be in dispute.

29
30

Kane v. Gaynor, supra note 27.

Haynes v. McGrath, 16 Misc.2d 76, 79, 103 N.Y.S.2d 889, 893 (Sup. Ct.
1951); People ex rel. Woods v. Flynn, 81 Misc. 279, 286, 142 N.Y. Supp. 230,
234 (Sup. Ct. 1913); [1919] NEw YoPx ATr'y GEN. ANNUAL REP. 131.
31 See note 34 infra.
s2 People ex reL. McLaughlin v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 450,
459-60 67 N.E. 78, 80 (1903).
33 Lenc v. Zicha, 223 A-p. Div. 158, 160, 227 N.Y. Supp. 704, 706-07 (1st
Dep't 1928), aff'd nenzem., 250 N.Y. 541, 166 N.E. 317 (1929); THMu ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 159 (1937).
34
See Schlobohn v. Municipal Housing Authority, 297 N.Y. 911, 912,
742, 743 (1948) (memorandum decision).
79 3N.E,2d
5
Ahern v. Board of Supervisors, 7 App. Div.2d 538, 545, 185 N.Y.S.2d
669, 676 (2d Dep't 1959) (dissenting opinion). "Where . . . no issues of
fact are involved and only questions of law arise, mandamus is the proper
remedy. . . . Otherwise the plaintiffs would be without remedy, since the
remedy of quo warranto only lies where the facts are in dispute." Lenc v.
Zicha, 223 App. Div. 158, 160, 227 N.Y. Supp. 704, 707 (1st Dep't 1928),
aff'd 2nem., 250 N.Y. 541, 166 N.E. 317 (1929) (emphasis added).
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Petitioner in this case seems to have a clear legal right to be

enforced. 36

There were no facts in dispute 37 and, as pointed out in

the dissent, even the law appears settled that the Board can appoint
only persons recommended by the county chairman.3 8 Nevertheless,
the Appellate Division reversed the lower court partially on the
factual situation presented. One is forced to ask what additional
facts the Court felt were necessary to make its determination.
Perhaps the Appellate Division felt that it was necessary to make
the appointee a party to the present proceeding. Section 193 of the
Civil Practice Act provides that a person is an indispensible party
if his absence will prevent an effective determination of the controversy or where his interests by non-joinder will be inequitably
affected by a judgment.8 9 It does not seem that the appointee is
indispensible to the determination of whether or not the Board of
Supervisors has performed a duty that has been specifically enjoined
by law. But whether the appointee's position as election commissioner was adversely affected by a non-joinder presents a more serious question. The law seems settled that where a Board of Supervisors appoints someone not recommended by the county political
chairman, the appointment is illegal. 40 If this result is reached the
contention that the position of the appointee will be inequitably
affected by a non-joinder appears to lose substance. If the appointment was illegal, as a matter of law, there seems little to be gained
by joining him as a party to the proceeding.41
Legislative action could probably remedy the difficulties the case
presents. The necessity of bipartisan control of the election commission is manifest. To insure this fundamental policy, perhaps the
county political chairman should be given the power to appoint the
commissioner who is to represent his party, by and with the consent
of the Board of Supervisors. Self interest should thereafter impel
the chairman to respond properly to serve the interests of his party
and the public interest as well.
A direct proceeding against the county chairman to make him
effectively fulfill his statutory duty, would probably be to no avail.
36 See Rivette v. Baker, 265 App. Div. 89, 91, 37 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (3d
Dep't 1942); cf. McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N.Y. 401, 411, 153 N.E. 849, 851
(1926); People ex rel. Daley v. Rice, 129 N.Y. 449, 454, 29 N.E. 355, 356
(1891).
37
Ahern v. Board of Supervisors, 7 App. Div.2d 538, 545, 185 N.Y.S.2d
669, 676 (2d Dep't 1959) (dissenting opinion).
38 Ibid.
39 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 193.
40 Kane v. Gaynor, 144 App. Div. 196, 129 N.Y. Supp. 280 (2d Dep't),
aff'd mern. on concurring opinion of Burr, J., 202 N.Y. 615, 616, 96 N.E. 1117
(1911); Haynes v. McGrath, 16 Misc.2d 76, 79, 103 N.Y.S.2d 889, 893 (Sup.
Ct. 1951); People ex rel. Woods v. Flynn, 81 Misc. 279, 286, 146 N.Y. Supp.
230, 234 (1913); [1919] NEw YORK Arr'y GEN. ANNUXL REP. 131.
4' See Rivette v. Baker, 265 App. Div. 89, 91, 37 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (3d
Dep't 1942).
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Although a court could possibly order him to appoint someone, it
could not tell him whom to appoint. 42 Therefore, it seems the chairman could continue to recommend only himself for the position.
The Appellate Division probably could have aided in the effectuation of stable county government to a greater extent by sustaining
the petition, rather than by dismissing it. The Board of Supervisors
should not be permitted to ignore what is undoubtedly the clear
mandate of the law to appoint only persons recommended by the
county political chairman. "The public interest requires that such
illegal procedure be disapproved." 43

M
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CIVIL SERVICE COmMIssION-ATTEMPT

TO ADJUST REQUIRED PASSING GRADE OF EXAMINATION WITHOUT
ADVANCE NOTICE TO CANDIDATES OF SUCH CHANGE HELD INVALID.

-Petitioners brought an Article 78 proceeding to annul the determination of the New York City Civil Service Commission affecting
the grading of a promotion examination. Candidates were required
to obtain a grade of seventy per cent in both parts of the written test
to qualify for the rest of the examination. Determining that Part I
had been too difficult, the Commission without advance notice applied
a conversion formula in accordance with a civil service rule, which did
not become effective, however, until two weeks after the examination
was held. Petitioners claimed that employment of the conversion
formula resulted in a greater number passing the entire examination,
thereby placing petitioners lower on the list. Reversing the Appellate
Division, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Civil Service
Commission may not lawfully adjust the required passing grade of an
examination unless it notifies the candidates in advance of the examination by duly promulgated rule that such an adjustment may
be made. Hymes v. Schechter, 6 N.Y.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 627,
189 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1959).
Regulation through the administrative process has been effectuated on both the state and federal levels since the founding of our
,country.' As a result of the steady growth of administrative law
"the state has extended its controls into every aspect of our indi-vidual and collective activities." 2 The reasons for the increase of
42 Gimprich v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 401, 406, 118 N.E.2d 578, 580
(1954) ; People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners, 149 N.Y. 26, 30, 43 N.E. 418,
419 (1896).
43 Ahern v. Board of Supervisors, 6 N.Y.2d 376, 383, 160 N.E.2d 640, 643,

189 N.Y.S.2d 888, 892 (1959)
1See GELLEORN & BYsE,
2 Kramer, The Place and
live Process, 28 FoRDHam L.

(dissenting opinion).
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1-7 (1954).
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REv. 1, 3 (1959).

